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III.
INTRODUCTION
This case is the result of an auto/infant pedestrian
accident that occurred on Manti's Main Street.

Prior to the trial,

the parties stipulated that the driver's insurance company would
pay the policy limits if the jury found that the driver ("Coons")
was one percent (1%) or more negligent (R. 60-62 Appellee's Brief,
Ex. B) . However, the jury found that the driver was not negligent
(R. 213 Appellee's Brief, Ex. C ) .
In

his

"Johnson" or the

opening

brief,

the

appellant

"Johnson child") argued that any

(hereinafter
disciplined

review of the undisputed evidence shows that reasonable minds must
conclude

that

Coons

was

to

some

degree

negligent.

More

specifically, Johnson said that it is undisputed that Coons saw the
Johnson child more than 200 feet away, Coons had a duty to slow
down but did not, Coons had a duty to pay attention to the child
but did not, and that had Coons slowed down or paid attention to
the child, there would have been no accident.
Johnson also showed that he should be awarded a new
trial because, over his counsel's objection, Coons was allowed to
present sympathetic and prejudicial statements to the jury.

Coons

and his counsel told the jury that (1) Coons did not feel well at
trial because he had suffered

from a parachute accident while

-1-

serving with the 82nd Airborne Division; (2) Coons has served his
country as an ex-infantry captain; and (3) Coons had suffered 13
operations and was disabled.

Finally, Johnson said that twice

during the trial proceedings, Coons had

improper

contact with

members of the jury and discussed activities as mutual friends.
The Court declined Coons' "Motion For a Judgment N.O.V. or in the
Alternative a New Trial."
In its answering brief, Coons claims that Johnson
failed to demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support
the verdict (Appellee's brief, p.6).

Coons says Johnson has not

marshalled the evidence supporting the verdict.

Coons also denies

that he had a duty to slow down or pay attention to the child after
he observed the child on the side of the road (Appellee's brief,
p.5).

In addition, Coons argues that Johnson waived any claim of

improper jury contact because his guardian and mother witnessed the
improper contact before jury deliberations but did not complain
until

after

the

jury

deliberations

(Appellee's

brief,

pp.

5,

25-29).
Further, Coons incredibly argues that there was no
prejudicial

testimony

appealing

to sympathy

(Appellee's

brief,

p. 31). However, Coons undermines his own argument when he notes
that the trial court repeatedly gave instructions that the jury was
not to decide the case on sympathy.

Coons then

subsequently

attempts to misdirect the court's attention from this issue by
-2-

arguing that "at trial [Johnson] either blessed or waived what he
now condemns" (Appellee's brief, pp. 37-38).
that

if there was

any

improper

Moreover, Coons says

sympathetic

testimony,

it was

Johnson's fault because "it resulted from the abusive, protracted
examination

of

Coons

by

plaintiff's

(Appellee's brief pp. 6, 39-42).
trial

court

errors

were

not

[Johnson's]

counsel"

Finally, Coons claims that any

prejudicial.

Coons' brief

also

contains many factual and legal misstatements.
This reply brief responds to each of Coons' foregoing
arguments and the factual and legal misstatements set forth in
Coons' brief.
IV.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT
BECAUSE COONS HAD A DUTY TO MAINTAIN A PROPER LOOKOUT
TOWARDS THE CHILDREN AND A MARSHALLING OF THE
EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT ALL REASONABLE MINDS MUST
CONCLUDE THAT COONS BREACHED THE DUTY
Coons is mistaken when he alleges that he did not have
a duty to maintain his lookout on the children near the side of the
road

(Appellee's brief, p . 6 ) .

Once Coons observed the Johnson

child near the side of the road, he had a duty to maintain a
reasonable proper and adequate lookout.

The lookout duty required

Coons to recurrently reobserve and reappraise the situation.

-3-

The

E.g.,

failure to do so is negligence.

Anderson v. Bradley, 590

P.2d, 329, 342 (Utah 1979).
Further, a marshalling of the evidence not in dispute
unquestionably establishes that Coons did not maintain his lookout
towards the children.
three

He took his eyes off the children for two to

seconds, so that he did

not

observe

the

Johnson

child

crossing the road until it was too late to avoid the accident.

As

such, all reasonable minds must conclude that Coons was to some
degree negligent.
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
VERDICT BECAUSE COONS HAD A DUTY TO SLOW DOWN
UPON SEEING THE CHILDREN PLAYING NEAR THE
ROAD AND A MARSHALLING OF THE EVIDENCE
SHOWS THAT ALL REASONABLE MINDS MUST
CONCLUDE THAT COONS BREACHED THE DUTY
Coons is also mistaken when he alleges that he did not
have a duty to slow down after observing the Johnson child playing
on the side of the road (Appellee's brief, p. 5 ) .

The cases and

statutes establishing the duty are found on pp. 19-21 of the Brief
of the Appellant and will not be repeated here.
Moreover, a marshalling of the undisputed testimony
shows that Coons did not slow down upon seeing the Johnson child
playing near the side of the road.
must

conclude

that

Coons

As such, all reasonable minds

breached

his

duty

to

slow

down.

Therefore, there is insufficient evidence to support the verdict.
-4-

POINT III.
THE CONCLUSORY STATEMENTS AND EVIDENCE
CITED IN APPELLEE'S BRIEF ARE INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT
As set forth in Point III of this brief, the evidence
cited by the Appellee in his brief either (1) does not establish
one way or the other whether Coons was negligent; or (2) consists
of

conclusory

statements

made

by

Coons'

experts

in

direct

contradiction to their factual testimony. As such, the evidence is
insufficient to support the verdict.
POINT IV.
THE JOHNSON CHILD DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO
SEEK A NEW TRIAL DUE TO THE IMPROPER ARGUMENT
AND TESTIMONY OFFERED BY COONS
When
military
objected.

service

Coons' counsel
and

began

surgeries,

to

talk

Johnson's

about

counsel

Coons'

promptly

However, because the objection was overruled, Johnson

was not required to repeatedly object during the trial.

To do so

would have prejudiced Johnson in the eyes of the jury.
POINT V.
THE JOHNSON CHILD DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO
SEEK A NEW TRIAL ON THE BASIS THAT COONS MADE
IMPROPER CONTACT WITH THE JURY
The lower court denied Johnson a new trial because
Johnson's parent and guardian ad litem

knew of Coons' improper

contact with the jury prior to the verdict.

However, the parent

had no duty to protect the litigation rights of the child.
-5-

In

addition, a guardian ad litem

does not have the power to waive the

child's litigation rights.

In contrast, when Johnson's counsel

learned of the improper juror contact, he timely moved for a new
trial within the time allowed by Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure,

When

confronted

with

the

improper

juror

contact

allegations, the lower court had a duty to protect the child as a
ward of the court.

Its failure to do so was reversible error.
POINT VI.

THE MISSTATEMENTS SET FORTH IN THE
APPELLEE'S BRIEF DO NOT JUSTIFY THE
LOWER COURT'S VERDICT AND JUDGMENT
As specifically listed in Point IV of the argument
section

of

this

brief,

the

misstatements

Appellee's brief do not justify the

set

forth

in

the

lower court's verdict and

judgment because they are factually or legally incorrect.
V.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT
BECAUSE COONS HAD A DUTY TO MAINTAIN A PROPER LOOKOUT
TOWARDS THE CHILDREN AND A MARSHALLING OF THE
EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT ALL REASONABLE MINDS MUST
CONCLUDE THAT COONS BREACHED THE DUTY
A.

Appellee's Brief.
Coons maintains

that he had

no duty

to keep

his

attention focused on the children playing near the side of the

-6-

road,

(Appellee's brief, p. 5), and that appellant failed to

marshall the evidence (Appellee's brief, p. 6).
B.

Standard of Review,
Appellate courts review the existence of a duty in a

negligence case under a correctness standard.

E.g.f

C.T. v.

Martinez, 845 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah 1992).
C.

Analysis.
Coons is mistaken when he alleges in his brief that he

did not have a duty to maintain his attention on the children near
the side of the road after he observed them.

In Marquez v. Pepsi

Cola Co. , 838 P.2d 660 (Utah App. 1992), the Utah Court of Appeals
surveyed the Utah appellate cases defining a motorist's duty to
look out for children and those cases which held, as a matter of
law, that a motorist was negligent after failing to maintain a
proper lookout.

The Marquez court explained that in Solt v.

Godfrey, 25 U.2d 210, 479 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah 1971), the Utah
Supreme Court set forth the duty of a motorist to keep a proper
lookout as follows:
Although the operator of a motor vehicle
is not held as a matter of law, to be
under a duty to look in a specific
direction at a specific time, he must
keep a lookout ahead, or in the
direction in which he is traveling, or
in the direction from which others may
be expected to approach, and is bound to
take notice of the road, to observe
conditions along the way, or conditions
immediately adjacent to the street, and
-7-

to know what is in front of him for a
reasonable distance.
A motorist has no right to assume that
the road or street is clear.
He is
bound to anticipate the presence thereon
of other persons, vehicles or objects
and children and be on the lookout for
them, and act at all times so as to
avoid collisions with them or injuring
them.
Marques. supra at 662.
The Solt court determined that a motorist who hit a
two year

old

child

running

into the

street

after

a ball was

negligent as a matter of law, Id. at 662. The court explained that
the child was in plain view and that there was no sudden darting
from behind
vision.

Jd.

wherein

the

anything which

could have obscured

the motorist's

Similarly, the Marquez court noted that other cases
courts

have

found

negligence

as

a matter

of

law

occurred when the party had a clear and unobstructed view of the
persons or objects prior to the accident.

See Mingus v. Olsson,

114 Utah 505, 201 P.2d 495, 498 (1949) (failed to look or, having
looked, failed to see what he should have seen) ; Gilliland v.
Rhoads, 539 P.2d 1221 (Wyo. 1975); Hallett v. Stone, 534 P.2d 232
(Kan. 1975).
Moreover at trial, Coons admitted that he owed a duty
to the child to pay attention to him.
Q:

[D]on't you think it would be
prudent when you're driving along
and you see kids along the road to
-8-

keep your attention on them until
you pass them?
A:

I sure do.
lines 5-8.)

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 244,

In conclusion, contrary to the unsupported assertions
in Coons1 brief, there is absolutely no question that once Coons
observed the child playing near the side of the road 200 or more
feet ahead, he had a duty to pay attention to the child until he
passed the child.
Johnson does not dispute that he has a duty to
marshall all of the existing evidence in support of the verdict.
The only lookout witness was Coons.
marshall is Coons' testimony.

Thus, the only evidence to

That evidence is marshalled on pp.

9-12 and 23-24 of appellant's opening brief.

The marshalled

evidence shows that there is no factual dispute that after Coons
saw the Johnson child on the side of the road, he did not continue
a proper lookout.

Instead, he took his eyes off of the children

for two to three seconds.

By the time he saw the child again,

Coons was unable to avoid the accident.

(Tr., Vol. I, pp. 222,

223, 219, 230 and 240).
In this appeal, Johnson has not selected parts of the
record favorable to him and ignored other parts.

Instead, Johnson

marshalled and summarized all of the evidence on the lookout issue.
The only evidence favorable to Coons was his preliminary testimony
that he "was watching forward and staying in the same lane. But at
-9-

the same time I always glance at my mirrors."
lines 3-19) , (Appellant's brief, p. 20.)

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 205,
But, he went on to

explain that he took his eyes off of the road for two to three
seconds. Thus, a marshalling of the evidence on the lookout issue
shows that all reasonable minds must conclude that Coons breached
his duty to maintain a proper lookout towards the children on the
side of the road.

Therefore, there was insufficient evidence to

support the verdict.1
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
VERDICT BECAUSE COONS HAD A DUTY TO SLOW DOWN
UPON SEEING THE CHILDREN PLAYING NEAR THE
ROAD AND A MARSHALLING OF THE EVIDENCE
SHOWS THAT ALL REASONABLE MINDS MUST
CONCLUDE THAT COONS BREACHED THE DUTY
A.

Appellee's Brief.
Coons, in his answering brief, alleges that Coons "did

not have a duty to slow down" after observing the Johnson child
playing on the side of the road.
B.

(Appellee's brief, p.5).

Standard of Review.
Whether a duty exists in a negligence case is a legal

issue reviewed under a correctness standard without deference to
the trial court.

C. T. v. Martinez, supra.

A determination of

negligence becomes a question of law when the undisputed facts
l

. The judgment was based solely on the jury's finding of no
negligence. The jury did not reach the issue of proximate cause.
(R. 213, 218-220.)
-10-

permit only one reasonable conclusion.

FMA Acceptance Co. v.

Leatherbury Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah, 1979); Marguez v.
Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., supra.
C.

Analysis.
Contrary

to

the

unsupported

assertions

in Coons'

brief, there is also absolutely no question that Coons, upon seeing
the children

200 feet away, had a duty to slow down.

Cases

establishing the duty are set forth in pp. 19-27 of the appellants
opening brief and will not be repeated here.

The duty is also

codified in Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-80 and 41-6-46(1).
The marshalled
Coons

did

not

slow

evidence

down.

As

unquestionably

explained

by

reconstructionist, the only evidence of speed
Coons 1

testimony.

There

is

no

objective

his

that

accident

in this case is

data,

conflicting testimony (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 455-456).

shows

there

is

no

Coons testified

that he was on cruise control at 30 miles per hour until he slammed
on his brakes just before impact.

He also testified that he did

not believe it was prudent to turn off the cruise control when he
first observed the children (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 235, 245, 134, 136).
Moreover, all of the expert testimony at trial concluded that had
Coons slowed down, Coons could have avoided the accident, because
it took the Johnson child 6.1 to 7.8 seconds to cross the road and
Coons only needed 3.8 to 4 seconds to stop (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 285288, 372, 490-493).
-11-

Since a marshalling of the evidence indisputably shows
that Coons breached his duty to slow down after observing the
children on the side of the road, and that had he done so, the
accident

would

have

been

avoided,

all

reasonable

conclude that Coons was to some degree negligent.

minds

must

Thus, there is

insufficient evidence to support the verdict that Coons was not
somewhat negligent.
POINT III.
THE CONCLUSORY STATEMENTS AND EVIDENCE CITED
IN APPELLEE'S BRIEF ARE INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT
A.

Appellee's Brief.
Coons summarized what he believes to be the evidence

supporting the verdict in pages 8-12 of his brief.

First, Coons

cites to his accident reconstruction expert's conclusion that the
only thing Coons could have done to avoid the accident was to be
clairvoyant.

However, the factual testimony

contrary to his conclusion.

of the expert is

Coons' expert calculated that Coons

was 2 07 feet away when he first saw the Johnson child (Tr. Vol. II,
p. 489, lines 20-25) . He also acknowledged that Coons was going 30
miles per hour (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 455-466) , and that the Johnson
child was going 7.7 to 10.7 feet per second (Tr. Vol. II, p. 460).
The expert also testified that it should have taken Coons only 43
feet, or about 2 seconds to stop from 3 0 miles per hour (Tr. Vol.
II, p. 480) .

Thus, if it takes the Johnson child at least 6
-12-

seconds to cross the road (7.7 to 10.7 feet per second divided into
62 feet, the width of the road) , Coons had the time to see the
child, slow down and stop.
Next,

Coons

cites

his

expert's

opinion

that

accident was the child's fault (Appellee's brief, pp. 8-9).

the
Of

course, by law, the child cannot be at fault, and Coons' expert was
well aware of the statute.

(Tr. Vol. II, pp. 507-508) .

More

importantly, whether the Johnson child was at fault is immaterial.
The parties stipulated that Coons' insurance company would pay the
policy limits if Coons was to any degree negligent.

Establishing

that the child was negligent does not mean that the driver was not
also negligent.
Third, Coons points out that he testified that he was
generally attentive (Appellee's brief, p. 9 ) .

However, when the

specifics of his attentiveness were challenged, he admitted that he
did not slow down and that he took his eyes off of the Johnson
child for two to three seconds.
Fourth,

Coons

cites

the

accident reconstructionist, Mr. Stevens.

testimony

of

his

other

Stevens described what,

in his view, is a motorist's duty to slow down and pay attention to
the child.

However, expert witnesses do not establish what the

legal duty is; the appellate courts do.
P.2d,

932, 936

(Utah 1994).

See State v. Penva, 869

Coons' duty to slow down and pay

-13-

attention to the child are correctly described in Points I and II
of this brief, and pages 18-21 of the appellantfs opening brief.
Subsequently, Coons cites the testimony

of

Bagley that "the boy on the bike ran into the trailer."

Roland

However,

that statement neither proves nor disproves that Coons, the driver,
was also negligent.
Finally, the testimony of Jamie Johnson set forth in
Appellee's brief, does not poke gaping holes in the plaintiff's
theory of the case.
Johnson

child

Coons testified that he first observed the

playing

near

the

side

of

the

road

with

other

children.
Q:

Now as you came north did there come
a time when you observed Ren Johnson
over on the west side of the street
at 4th North.

A:

Yes, but I didn't just observe—
observe him.
There were a lot of
kids—no, I guess you wouldn't say a
lot of kids. There were a couple of
kids with him on the west side and
they began on the north corner on
the west side but then there were
also some kids running around on
Mrs. Johnson's property on the—the
east side.
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 201,
lines 21-25; 202, lines 1-3.)

Thus, it is immaterial whether Johnson traveled south
on the west side of the road before crossing Main Street.

Coons'

testimony was that, at the time of the accident, there was plenty
of light and visibility was excellent.
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(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 200, lines

19-20;

201, lines

discovered

or

2-4, 19-20.)

cited

to

any

No party

testimony

to this appeal

showing

that

has

anything

obstructed Coons' view from the time he first saw the Johnson child
until the time of the collision.
B.

Analysis.
The

burden

of

showing

that there

is

insufficient

evidence to support the verdict is not much different than the
showing required of a litigant successfully moving for summary
judgment.

A summary judgment is appropriate when there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, e.g.,
259 U.A.R. 3 (Utah 1995).

Jackson v. Righter,

Further, the evidence is reviewed in the

light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.

Id.

Similarly, an appellate court will not grant a new trial or reverse
a verdict for insufficient evidence if reasonable men can draw
different conclusions from conflicting evidence.

Pollesche v.

Transamerican Insurance Company, 27 U.2d 430, 434 497, P.2d 236
(1972).

Moreover, on review, the appellate courts review the

evidence in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed at
trial.

Marquez, supra, at 661; Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14

(Utah 1988).

The foregoing criteria are nearly identical.

The

difference is in a summary judgment proceeding, the court cannot
weigh the testimony or the evidence submitted to it.

See Singleton

v. Alexander, 19 U.2d 292, 294 431 P,2d 126 (1967); Sandberg v.
-15-

Kline

576 P.2d

1291, (Utah 1978); Spor v. Crest Butte Silver

Mining, Inc., 740 P.2d 1304, 1308 (Utah 1987).
Johnson has not discovered any Utah appellate court
decisions considering the issue of whether conclusory testimony is
sufficient to support a verdict.

However, there are many Utah

cases holding that conclusory testimony, standing alone, is not
sufficient to either obtain or oppose a summary judgment.
e.g.,

See,

Winter v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 820 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah

1991);

Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 102-103

(Utah 1992);

(affidavit must set forth the specific facts that logically support
the expert's conclusion); Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130, 1137 (Utah
App.

1988)

(expert opinion must set forth a sufficient

factual

basis); see also Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Lundcrren, 692
P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1984) (factual conclusions are insufficient).
Since the conclusory evidence cited in Coons 1 brief is
insufficient to support or oppose a summary judgment, and since the
criteria for obtaining a summary judgment and challenging a verdict
for insufficient evidence are comparable, it follows that the selfserving conclusions set forth in Coons1 brief are insufficient to
support the verdict.
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POINT IV.
THE JOHNSON CHILD DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO
SEEK A NEW TRIAL DUE TO THE IMPROPER ARGUMENT
AND SYMPATHETIC TESTIMONY OFFERED BY COONS
A,

Appellee's Brief.
Coons

in

his

brief

argues:

(1) There

was

no

prejudicial appeal to sympathy; (2) Coons waived the issue by not
including it in his docketing statement; (3) Coons waived the issue
at trial; and (4) if there was sympathetic argument and testimony,
the argument and testimony was harmless

(Appellee's brief, pp.

31-42) .
B.

Analysis.
Coons is incorrect when he says that there was no

prejudicial appeal to sympathy.

Telling the jury about unrelated

surgeries and the suffering resulting from the surgeries, is a
prejudicial appeal to sympathy.

Rogers v. Owens, 440 S.W.2d, 406,

407 (Tex. App. 1968), reversed on other grounds 446 S.W.2d, 165
(Tex. 1969) . So is a reference to war service, wounds or injuries.
See Predovich v. New York Central R.R. Co. , 175 N.E. 580, 581 (111.
App.

1961).
Coons is also mistaken when he alleges that Johnson

waived the issue at trial. When Coons' counsel started to tell the
jury about Coons1 parachute accident, Johnson f s counsel promptly
objected, but was overruled (Tr. Vol. I, p. 115, lines 2-9). This
objection preserved the issue for appeal.
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A subsequent objection

was not necessary.

See also Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing Inc. , 787

P. 2d, 525, 528 (Utah App. 1990) (A matter is sufficiently raised if
it is submitted to the trial court and the trial court is offered
an opportunity to rule on the issue) . Simply put, once a party has
objected and attained a ruling clearly indicating the attitude of
the court, the party is not required to repeat the objection each
time the issue comes up.

Once the court has clearly ruled,

repeated objections serve only to waste the court's time and
prejudice the objecting party in the eyes of the jury.

E.g.,

United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d, 694, 695 (5th Cir. 1978); Ladd.
"Common Mistakes in the Techniques of Trial," 22 Iowa Law Review,
609 (1937); see also State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1071 (Utah
1987); State v. Aquilar, 758 P.2d, 457, 458 (Utah App. 1988).
Further, Johnson's subsequent acquiescence does not rise to the
level of a blessing.

Once the court allowed the statements about

Coons' army service and surgeries and injuries, courtroom etiquette
mandated deferential treatment.
Coons is also incorrect when he argues that Johnson
waived the issue when he failed to include it in his docketing
statement.
argument.

The cases cited in Coons' brief do not support his
The cases all involve situations wherein the appellant

either did not file a notice of appeal, a docketing statement, or
failed to set forth a jurisdictional basis of the appeal.
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Coons' failure to find a Utah case holding that an
issue is waived if not set forth in the docketing statement is not
surprising, since the primary purpose of a docketing statement is
only to assist the Court in determining whether the appeal should
be heard by the Utah Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals (URAP
9 (b) . An appellant is entitled to have the issues heard on appeal
that he raised in the lower court.

Issues not raised in the lower

court ordinarily are not considered.

E.g.

Shire Development v.

Frontier Investments, 799 P.2d, 221, 224 (Utah App. 1990). In this
case, all of the appellate issues were raised in the lower court.
The verdict was challenged for insufficient evidence in Johnson's
Motion for a Judgment N.O.V., Or in the Alternative, a New Trial.
In the same motion, Johnson asked for a new trial because of Coons'
improper conduct with the jury (R. 229-252).

As set forth above,

Johnson timely objected to the sympathetic statements made by
Coons' counsel.
POINT V.
THE JOHNSON CHILD DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT
TO A NEW TRIAL ON THE BASIS THAT COONS
MADE IMPROPER CONTACT WITH THE JURY
A.

Appellee's Brief.
Coons claims that the Johnson child may not seek a new

trial based on Coons' improper conduct with the jury because
Johnson's parent and guardian knew of the contact prior to the time
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the jury was instructed, but the Johnson child did not object until
after the verdict (Appellee's brief, pp. 25-29).
B.

Analysis.
The first problem with Appellee's argument is that it

does not fully explain what occurred in the lower court.

The

affidavit of Johnson's mother (R. 223-224, Brief of Appellant,
Ex. 4) shows on August 6, she observed, Michael Coons conversing
with some jurors, discussing their mission and other matters.
addition, Johnson's guardian ad litem,

and the guardian ad

In

litem's

legal assistant, observed Coons engaged in improper jury contact on
the last day of the trial while Johnson's counsel was meeting with
the court and Coons' counsel to construct jury instructions (R.
223-226, Brief of Appellant, Ex. 4). However, Johnson's counsel
did not learn of the improper contact until after the jury's
verdict (R. 294-295, see brief of appellee, p. 29). Upon learning
of the improper contact, Johnson's counsel filed a motion for a
judgment N.O.V. or, in the alternative, a new trial.

Thus, the

narrow issue is whether the improper contact issue is waived when
an infant's parent or guardian ad litem

learns of the improper

contact prior to the verdict but the infant's counsel does not.
The second problem with Coons' argument is that none
of the cases cited in his brief address this issue.

None of the

cases involves improper juror contact and none concerns a child
plaintiff. In State v. Day, 815 P.2d, 1345, 1349 (Utah App. 1991),
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the Court of Appeals held that failure to raise an objection of
improper juror contact is waived when the party's counsel knew of
the contact prior to the verdict, but failed to object to the trial
court.

In this case, Johnson's counsel met the standard.

After

the verdict, and upon learning of Coons' improper contact with the
jury, he filed a motion for a new trial within the time limits
allowed by Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
In State v. Pike, 712 P.2d, 277 (Utah 1985), a case of
improper juror contact with facts similar to the case at Bar, the
trial court and counsel agreed to let the incident go until after
the verdict.

However, by allowing the trial court to make a

decision after the trial, the appellant did not waive his right of
appellate review.

See Id. at 279.

Thus, simply because Johnson

asked the trial court to review the issue after the verdict should
not operate as a waiver of the child's right of review.
Further, Coons' argument that the child should be
found to have waived his right to appellate review because his
guardian ad litem

and parent knew of the misconduct prior to the

verdict fails to consider the proper relationship of the parent,
the guardian ad litem,

the child and the court.2

"Historically,

the law has recognized that special rules are necessary to protect

2

That relationship was explained to the trial court in
Johnson's "Memorandum in Response to Order on Motions" (R. 294298) .
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the legal rights of children • . . . Because of their

lack of

experience, judgment, knowledge, resources, and awareness, minors
cannot effectively assert and protect their legal rights."
Gaufin, 867 P.2d, 572, 578 (Utah 1993).

M

Lee v.

[C]ourts have typically

treated minors involved in litigation as if they were wards of the
court, even when a minor has an adult representative who appears in
court as a guardian ad litem."

Id.

In this case, the lower court did not treat the child
as a ward of the court.

Instead,

child's claim

jury misconduct

of

improper

parent and guardian ad litem

it summarily dismissed
because the

the

child f s

knew of improper contact prior to the

verdict (R. 327-328) . However, a parent does not have a legal duty
to assert or otherwise protect a minor's legal claim.

Id., at 578.

Parents or natural guardians have no specific legal duty to perform
and have no responsibility to their minor offspring other than
their moral obligation.

Scott v. School Board of Granite School

District, 568 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah 1977).

Thus, the court could not

impose a waiver upon the child for the parent's failure to do
something the parent has no duty to do.
litem

Similarly, a guardian ad

cannot bind the infant by any waivers "except as to such

minor matters as are necessary to facilitate the purposes of the
suit and do not affect the infant's substantive rights."
Jur. 2d Infant § 184 at 169-70 (1969).
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42

Am.

In summary, the guardian ad litem

had no power to

waive the child's litigation rights, the parent had no duty to
protect the child's litigation rights, Johnson's counsel acted in
a timely fashion to protect the child's litigation rights, but the
court failed in its duty to protect the child as the court's ward.
The sum of the foregoing requires a new trial.
POINT VI.
THE MISSTATEMENTS SET FORTH IN THE APPELLEE'S
BRIEF DO NOT JUSTIFY THE LOWER COURT'S
VERDICT AND JUDGMENT
The following facts and legal misstatements set forth
in Appellee's brief do not justify the lower court's verdict and
judgment:
1.
dart out case.

Appellee mistakenly alleges that this is a child
(Appellee's brief, p. 2). This is not a child dart

out case. As set forth in the statement of the case section of the
appellant's opening brief, unlike a dart out case, the motorist's
view was not obstructed. Coons saw the child playing near the side
of the road approximately 200 feet before the collision. Moreover,
the child did not come from Coons' side of the road.

He began

crossing the road from the opposite side. Two cars in the traffic
lane closest to the Johnson child were able to stop and avoid
harming the child. However, Coons, traveling in the farthest lane
of traffic, did not stop or avoid the accident.

-23-

2.

This appeal is not based on, and never was based

on, the notion that because an accident occurred, someone was
negligent

(Appelleefs brief, pp. 5, 15).

What this appeal is

based on, is that all reasonable minds must conclude that Coons
breached two duties of care (lookout and speed) so Coons was at
least to some small degree negligent.

See Points I and II of this

brief.
3.

The errors committed by the lower court were not

harmless (Appellee's brief pp. 19-22).

A judgment and verdict

based upon insufficient evidence is not harmless error, it is
prejudicial error, requiring a new trial. Moreover, once improper
juror contact is shown, the contact is presumed prejudicial absent
a satisfactory explanation. State v. Pike, supra. Finally, to show
that the sympathetic statements made by Coons and his counsel were
prejudicial only requires that Johnson establish that there is a
reasonable likelihood that a more favorable result would have been
obtained absent the sympathetic

statements.

The overwhelming

evidence that Coons breached his duty to maintain a proper lookout
and his duty to slow down, coupled with the juryfs finding of no
negligence

and the

sympathetic

statements made to the jury,

unquestionably establishes that there is a reasonable likelihood
that a different verdict would have occurred absent the sympathetic
statements.
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VII.
CONCLUSION
A marshalling of all of the evidence in support of the
verdict unquestionably establishes that all reasonable minds must
conclude that Coons was to some degree negligent.

That is, Coons

breached his duty to maintain a proper lookout towards the Johnson
child, and he breached his duty to maintain a proper speed upon
seeing the children on the side of the road.
conclusory

statements

set

forth

insufficient to support the verdict.

in

Moreover, the

appellee's

brief

are

The Johnson child did not

waive his right to obtain a new trial based upon Coons' improper
contact with
sympathy.

the

jury or upon Coons' prejudicial

appeal to

All of the foregoing requires either a new trial or a

judgment N.O.V.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of April, 1995.
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